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Path _posts/military/1778-07-03-war-bavarian-succession.md
URL /news/military/war-bavarian-succession/
Date 1778-07-03
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War of the Bavarian Succession

Military Events

Key figures: Frederick II of Prussia, Emperor Joseph II of Austria, Empress Maria Theresa, Charles Theodore (Elector of Bavaria), Charles II August (Duke of Zweibrücken), Field Marshal Gideon Ernst von Laudon (Austria), Catherine II of Russia

Summary

The War of the Bavarian Succession (1778–1779) was a conflict between Prussia and Austria over the inheritance of the Bavarian Electorate, fought primarily through strategic maneuver rather than pitched battle. Its popular nickname, the Potato War (Kartoffelkrieg in German, Zwetschgenrummel—”Plum Fuss”—in Austrian dialect), reflected soldiers’ main occupation: foraging for potatoes and other provisions in the Bohemian countryside rather than fighting.

The immediate cause was the death of Elector Maximilian III Joseph of Bavaria on December 30, 1777, without a direct heir. Within days, Emperor Joseph II acted: on January 3, 1778, his government concluded the Convention of Vienna with the new Elector, Charles Theodore of the Palatinate, under which Charles Theodore ceded Lower Bavaria and portions of the Upper Palatinate to Austria in exchange for recognition of his uncertain legitimacy. This agreement, negotiated in secret, alarmed both Prussia and the secondary German states, who feared Austrian domination of the Holy Roman Empire.

Frederick II of Prussia, then 66 years old, mobilized quickly. He secured the support of Charles II August, Duke of Zweibrücken, the heir presumptive who had not consented to the Convention of Vienna and whose rights were now threatened. Frederick also opened diplomatic channels to Saxony, which likewise had territorial claims on Bavarian lands.

Background and Causes

The Bavarian succession crisis was the latest episode in the long Austro-Prussian dualism that had defined central European politics since Frederick’s seizure of Silesia in 1740. Joseph II had been pushing to expand Habsburg influence within the Empire since becoming co-ruler with his mother Maria Theresa in 1765. His absorption of parts of Poland in the first partition (1772) had demonstrated his willingness to use diplomatic sleight-of-hand for territorial gain.

Austria’s legal argument rested on an old Wittelsbach inheritance compact; Prussia’s counter-argument held that Charles Theodore could not alienate lands belonging to the dynasty without consent of all claimants. Frederick calculated that Austria’s gains—potentially a land bridge connecting Bohemia to the Tirol—would fundamentally shift the imperial balance of power.

Military Campaign

Phase 1 — Mobilization (Spring–July 1778)

Prussia mobilized two armies: Frederick commanded the main army of approximately 80,000 men advancing into Bohemia from the north, while his brother Prince Henry led a secondary force of roughly 40,000 advancing through Lusatia. Austria fielded a substantially larger force under Field Marshal Gideon Ernst von Laudon, with the emperor himself present at the front in a command role. Estimates of Austrian strength vary between 160,000 and 180,000 troops.

Phase 2 — Stalemate in Bohemia (July–September 1778)

Frederick crossed into Bohemia on July 3, 1778, but the campaign immediately stalled. Austrian commanders skillfully held mountain passes and fortified positions, refusing to offer open battle. Supply became Frederick’s decisive problem: the army’s commissariat struggled to feed the troops, and disease—dysentery in particular—spread through the ranks. The Bohemian plateau in summer offered forage rather than glory, and soldiers on both sides spent weeks digging for potatoes.

By mid-September 1778, Frederick withdrew his army back into Silesia and Saxony. Prince Henry achieved somewhat better results in the north, occupying sections of Bohemia before he, too, disengaged. No major engagement had been fought.

Phase 3 — Diplomatic Resolution (Winter 1778–Spring 1779)

The decisive action moved to the courts. Empress Maria Theresa, opposed to her son’s war from the outset, used her personal correspondence network to signal Austrian willingness to negotiate. The intervention of Catherine II of Russia—who threatened to deploy a substantial force in support of Prussia if Austria refused arbitration—proved decisive. France, already drawn into the American conflict through the Franco-American Alliance of February 1778 and facing British hostility (see Britain Declares War on France), had no appetite for another theater and pressed for settlement.

Treaty of Teschen (May 13, 1779)

The war ended with the Treaty of Teschen, signed on May 13, 1779, in the Silesian town of Teschen (modern Cieszyn, on the Polish-Czech border). The terms largely restored the prewar status quo:

  • Austria retained only the Innviertel, a strip of territory on the south bank of the Inn River totaling approximately 1,800 km² with a population of roughly 100,000—a fraction of what Joseph II had sought in Bavaria.
  • Prussia received no territorial gains but blocked Austrian expansion.
  • Charles II August of Zweibrücken’s reversionary rights to Bavaria were confirmed.
  • France and Russia served as joint guarantors of the peace.

Maria Theresa reportedly wept with relief. The settlement confirmed what Prussia’s intervention had signaled: no single power could unilaterally alter the German territorial order without triggering a multilateral response.

Significance

The War of the Bavarian Succession occupies a distinctive place in eighteenth-century military history for what it did not produce. Unlike Frederick’s earlier campaigns—the three Silesian Wars and the Seven Years’ War—the Potato War ended without a Frederician battle: no Rossbach, no Leuthen, no Kunersdorf. Contemporaries noted this. Frederick himself later described the campaign as one of the most unsatisfying of his career, constrained by logistics, age, and an adversary unwilling to be drawn into the open-field confrontations at which he excelled.

Several legacies endured:

  1. The Austro-Prussian dualism entrenched: The war confirmed that neither power could dominate Germany without triggering a European coalition. This equilibrium persisted until 1866, when Prussia finally expelled Austria from the German state system at Königgrätz.

  2. Russia’s emergence as a German-affairs arbiter: Catherine II’s willingness to threaten armed intervention on Frederick’s behalf demonstrated the extent to which the eastern powers had become indispensable to western European political settlements.

  3. Frederick’s twilight: At 66, directing aging reserve troops on a supply-starved march through Bohemia, Frederick showed none of the operational élan of his youth. The Potato War is widely regarded as the last major campaign of his career.

  4. A “cabinet war” model: The conflict exemplified the eighteenth-century ideal of limited war—armies in the field, population not devastated, objectives pursued diplomatically. It contrasts sharply with the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars that would follow within a decade.

See Also

  • Battle of Monmouth — major American battlefield engagement fought the same month, June 1778
  • Valley Forge Encampment — the supply and endurance crisis facing the Continental Army mirrors the Bavarian campaign’s logistical failures
  • Franco-American Alliance — France’s commitment to the American war shaped its reluctance to engage in a German conflict simultaneously
  • Britain Declares War on France — the broader European war context in which the Bavarian succession dispute unfolded
  • Comte de Vergennes — the French foreign minister who pressed Russia to mediate the conflict, keeping France free to concentrate its resources against Britain

Sources