Military Figure: Sir William Howe (knighted KB 1776; later 5th Viscount Howe), Commander-in-Chief of British forces in North America (1775–1778)
Key Dates: January–October 1777
Summary
In 1777, General William Howe pursued an ambitious but strategically problematic campaign to capture Philadelphia, the rebel capital, as the centerpiece of British operations. Rather than coordinating with General John Burgoyne’s northern campaign from Canada (which aimed to seize Albany and split the colonies), Howe prioritized a southern offensive via the Chesapeake Bay. The strategy achieved tactical victories at Brandywine Creek (September 11) and the occupation of Philadelphia (September 26, 1777), but at the cost of failing to support Burgoyne’s concurrent campaign, leaving that army isolated and ultimately leading to its surrender at Saratoga on October 17, 1777.
Howe’s Strategic Objectives
In late 1776, Howe had proposed multiple options for the 1777 campaign: a push up the Hudson River to Albany, expanded operations from Newport, and an invasion of Pennsylvania. By mid-1777, he settled on a bold but controversial approach — rather than reinforcing the northern theater, he committed the bulk of his force to seizing Philadelphia, believing that capturing the colonial capital would demoralize the rebel leadership and force capitulation through negotiation.
Howe’s operational philosophy emphasized maneuver and tactical superiority over mass casualties. A competent tactician, he preferred to demonstrate overwhelming British military skill in battle, hoping this would convince the Americans that continued resistance was futile and reconciliation inevitable.
London’s Role: Lord George Germain and the Command Failure
A central but often overlooked factor in the strategic breakdown was the role of Lord George Germain, British Secretary of State for the American Colonies, who bore responsibility for coordinating the campaigns from London. Germain approved Howe’s Philadelphia plan in early 1777 while simultaneously approving Burgoyne’s northward advance from Canada — two major operations that were never formally synchronized. Germain’s approval letter to Burgoyne promised that Howe would cooperate, yet Germain never issued Howe a direct order to march north to Albany.
This failure of command coordination — arising from slow transatlantic communication, bureaucratic ambiguity, and perhaps Germain’s own inexperience — meant that Howe and Burgoyne operated on different strategic assumptions. Howe believed his Philadelphia campaign was sanctioned independently; Burgoyne believed support from the south was forthcoming. Neither assumption proved correct, with catastrophic consequences for the northern army. For more on Germain’s role in British strategy, see Lord George Germain.
The Philadelphia Campaign
July–September 1777: In July, Howe embarked approximately 15,000 troops aboard transports, sailing into the Chesapeake Bay rather than marching north along the Hudson. The fleet of 260 vessels departed New York on July 23, 1777 — a route so indirect that Washington initially believed Howe was heading for Charleston or another southern target. The fleet entered the Chesapeake Bay on August 14 and landed at Head of Elk, Maryland (modern Elkton) on August 25, 1777. This unexpected approach forced Washington to shift his army southward to defend Pennsylvania.
Battle of Brandywine (September 11, 1777): The clash involved over 30,000 troops—the single largest engagement on North American soil during the entire war. Howe executed a masterful flanking maneuver, sending General Charles Cornwallis with 8,000 men on a wide encirclement while General Wilhelm von Knyphausen’s force engaged Washington’s attention frontally. Exploiting a critical gap in Washington’s defensive line at the Brandywine River, Cornwallis struck Washington’s exposed right flank. The Continental Army lost approximately 1,200 men killed, wounded, and captured, against British casualties of around 600. The detailed account of this engagement is covered in Battle of Brandywine.
Pursuit and Philadelphia’s Fall (September–November 1777): After Brandywine, Howe’s forces won further engagements at the Battle of the Clouds (September 16) and the Paoli Massacre (September 20–21), where General “Mad Anthony” Wayne’s brigade was surprised by a British night attack under General Charles Grey, who ordered his troops to remove their flintlocks’ flints to ensure silence — resulting in 150–200 American casualties by bayonet alone. On September 26, 1777, British forces under Cornwallis marched into Philadelphia, capturing the colonial capital and forcing the Continental Congress to flee first to Lancaster and then York, Pennsylvania.
Washington attempted to counterattack at the Battle of Germantown on October 4, 1777, with four columns converging on the British camp. Though the assault initially succeeded in breaking British lines, confusion caused by morning fog and a critical delay at Chew House (a fortified stone mansion defended by a British detachment) allowed Howe to rally his forces and repulse the attack. Washington’s army retreated northwest, eventually establishing winter quarters at Valley Forge in December 1777.
The Fatal Coordination Failure
While Howe won tactical victories in the south, General John Burgoyne’s northern campaign unfolded in catastrophic isolation. Operating from Canada with only 8,000 troops, Burgoyne expected Howe to either move north to Albany or at minimum provide supplies and reinforcements. Neither occurred.
Burgoyne’s army, advancing south toward Albany along the Hudson, captured Fort Ticonderoga on July 6, 1777 — an initial success that proved costly when it emboldened Burgoyne to continue south despite his lengthening supply lines and growing American resistance. By August, Burgoyne had suffered significant setbacks: American forces under General John Stark destroyed a British foraging expedition at the Battle of Bennington (August 16), costing Burgoyne nearly 1,000 men. American Militia and Continental troops swelled in the Hudson Valley, inspired by local defense and French arms shipments.
At the two Battles of Saratoga (September 19 and October 7, 1777), Burgoyne’s attempts to break through American lines failed. Surrounded, with supplies exhausted and no relief from Howe or Clinton, Burgoyne was forced to surrender his entire army of approximately 6,000 British and German troops to American General Horatio Gates at Saratoga on October 17, 1777. The loss shocked London and transformed international perceptions of American viability.
When news of Saratoga reached Paris in December 1777, King Louis XVI moved decisively to recognize American independence and commit French military resources — a decision that ultimately guaranteed British defeat. The details of the Franco-American diplomatic breakthrough that followed trace directly to the strategic vacuum Howe’s southward campaign created.
Howe’s Resignation and Legacy
In the aftermath of Saratoga, Howe wrote to London in October 1777 requesting to be recalled. He formally resigned command on May 24, 1778, and was replaced by General Sir Henry Clinton, who faced the daunting task of reorganizing British strategy after France’s entry into the war. Upon returning to Britain, Howe faced criticism in Parliament from both loyalists and reformers, though no formal censure was ever adopted. Howe defended his conduct in a pamphlet war with Burgoyne’s supporters, arguing he had never received clear orders to support the northern campaign.
Strategic Assessment
Howe’s 1777 campaign exposed a fundamental flaw in British strategy: the failure to coordinate multiple theaters of operation. His focus on the symbolic prize of Philadelphia came at the cost of the broader strategic objective — defeating the Continental Army and pacifying the colonies through overwhelming military presence. The capture of the colonial capital proved strategically hollow; Washington’s army remained intact and operational, and Howe was unable to prosecute the war effectively from inside an occupied city surrounded by hostile countryside.
The contrast between Howe’s tactical competence (Brandywine was a masterful maneuver) and strategic misjudgment (abandoning Burgoyne) defined his 1777 campaign. His decision to pursue Philadelphia rather than coordinate with the north remains controversial among historians, with some arguing he received contradictory orders from London and others contending that he misread the overall campaign requirements.
British historian John Fortescue, writing in the early 20th century, concluded that Howe “sacrificed an army” by failing to cooperate with Burgoyne. American historian Don Higginbotham argued that the fault lay primarily with Germain’s failure to enforce coordination, not with Howe’s independent decision-making. The debate continues, though most modern assessments fault both men equally for the strategic disaster.
Significance
Howe’s 1777 strategy and its consequences marked a crucial turning point in the Revolutionary War. The failure to eliminate Washington’s army or break the colonial will to resist, combined with the collapse of the northern campaign, convinced French leadership that American independence was achievable. The entry of France transformed the conflict from a civil war into a global struggle involving Britain, France, Spain, and eventually the Netherlands — a war Britain could not win. Howe’s subsequent campaigns would be hamstrung by the need to defend against French forces, ultimately contributing to British defeat in 1783.